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The Relationship between Anxiety, Mind Wandering and Task-switching: A 
Diffusion Model Analysis 
Andree Hartanto 
ABSTRACT 
Although the negative impact of anxiety on task-switching has been documented, 
little is known about the extent or mechanisms of this impairment primarily 
because of the complex nature of task-switching and difficulty in probing the 
occurrence of worries within participants. To address this issue, we employed a 
stochastic diffusion model analysis along with a novel thought-probe technique in 
task-switching paradigm. Across 152 participants, we found state anxiety was 
linked to higher switch costs in nondecision time but not drift rate parameter of 
diffusion model, which indicates that the locus of task-switching impairment in 
anxious individuals is pertinent to the efficiency of task-set reconfiguration but 
not proactive interference processes. Furthermore, we found boundary separation 
parameter – which quantifies conservative decisional styles – heightened as a 
function of anxiety, supporting the existence of compensatory strategy in anxious 
individuals. We also found anxiety increased mixing costs in task-switching 
paradigm, which extends the implication of anxiety to global sustained control 
mechanisms in task-switching. Interestingly, we found that impaired performance 
by anxiety was not attributed to the frequency of worrisome thoughts during task-
switching. These findings elucidate several theoretical assumptions on the 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Anxiety is a common human experience which is characterized by aversive emotional 
state due to perceived threatening circumstances. It has been known to be hugely disruptive 
to cognitive functioning even when the task is non-threatening (Edwards, Edwards, Lyvers, 
2015). In particular, the influence of anxiety on task-switching—the ability to switch back 
and forth between multiple tasks, operations, or mental sets (Monsell, 2003)—has received a 
fair amount of attention. Despite frequent experience of anxiety and daily engagement in 
task-switching in our daily life, however, little is known about the extent or mechanisms of 
the negative effect of anxiety on task-switching (Eysenck & Derakshan, 2011). For instance, 
although task-switching has been demonstrated to implicate multiple components of 
cognitive processes (Mayr & Kliegl, 2003; Ruthruff, Remington, & Johnston, 2001), there is 
no study to date that has examined the specific component of task-switching that is disrupted 
by anxiety. Similarly, the assumption that anxious individuals employed compensatory 
strategy to maintain their task-switching accuracy (Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 
2007) has not been directly demonstrated in the previous literature. Furthermore, it is not 
clear whether the negative effect of anxiety on task-switching efficiency is purely driven by 
heightened worrisome thoughts in anxious individuals. With these issues in mind, I aim to 
elucidate the extent and mechanism underlying the negatively effect of anxiety on task-
switching by using a novel thought-probe method (Stawarczyk, Majerus, Maj, Van der 
Linden, & D’ Argembeau, 2011; Unsworth & McMillan, 2014) and the stochastic diffusion 
model analysis (Ratcliff, 1978).  
 Anxiety can be conceptualized in terms of either personality aspect (i.e., trait anxiety) 
or emotional state (i.e., state anxiety; Spielberger, 1972). State anxiety is characterized by 
experience of apprehension that occurs in response to subjectively threatening events with an 





or waiting to receive an examination result. Trait anxiety, on the other hand, is a stable 
individual’s tendency to experience anxiety across various context and events. According to 
previous studies, both high trait and state anxiety have been shown to be associated with 
impaired task-switching performance, but this effect was evident only when performance was 
assessed in terms of reaction times (RT) but not in accuracy (Ansari, Derakshan, & Richards, 
2008; Edwards et al., 2015; Derakshan, Smyth, & Eysenck, 2009). 
 Attentional control theory (Eysenck et al., 2007) is the most well-known approach to 
explain why trait and state anxiety affect task-switching (for a theoretical review on the effect 
of anxiety on cognitive performance, see Derakshan & Eysenck, 2009). The theory postulates 
that both trait and state anxiety reduce attentional focus during task-switching because 
attentional resources are allocated to internal threat-related stimuli (e.g., worrisome thoughts). 
As a result, task-switching performance should be compromised owing to lesser attentional 
resources available to switch between concurrent tasks. The theory also explains why anxiety 
affects RT (i.e., speed) but not task-switching accuracy (Ansari et al., 2008; Edwards et al., 
2015; Derakshan et al., 2009). Importantly, the theory distinguishes performance 
effectiveness from processing efficiency. Specifically, performance effectiveness relates to 
the quality of performance that is typically assessed by outcome measures such as the 
accuracy of the task, whereas processing efficiency relates to the extent to and manner in 
which processing resources are invested in doing the task, and thus is typically measured by 
the time spent. The theory predicts that anxiety will influence efficiency assessed by RT, but 
not effectiveness assessed by accuracy because anxious individuals are motivated to 
compensate performance effectiveness at the cost of efficiency, i.e., increased processing 
time. In other words, anxiety is more likely to entail the use of a compensatory strategy which 






Although the attentional control theory (Eysenck et al., 2007) has received 
considerable supports for the notion that trait and state anxiety impair task-switching 
performance in terms of RT but not accuracy (Ansari et al., 2008; Goodwin & Sher, 1992), 
many of its underlying assumptions have not been directly tested. For instance, attentional 
control theory (Eysenck et al., 2007) assumes that the negative effect of trait or state anxiety 
on the transient cost of task-switching (i.e., switch costs) is due to impaired efficiency in 
exerting attentional control of task-set reconfiguration (i.e., a process of replacing a task with 
a new task; Rogers & Monsell, 1995). Although this assumption appears to be supported by 
previous studies which have found higher switch costs among individuals with high trait 
anxiety (Ansari et al., 2009) or state anxiety (Derakshan et al., 2009), it is noteworthy that 
switch costs arises from not only task-set reconfiguration but also proactive interference (i.e., 
a general slow down after switching to a new task due to an interference from a previous 
task; Wylie & Allport, 2000). Thus, without dissociating the effect of anxiety on task-set 
reconfiguration from the effect of anxiety on proactive interference of switch costs, it is still 
unclear which specific component of task-switching is directly affected by anxiety. This is 
critical since Pacheco-Unguetti, Acosta, Callejas, and Lupiáñez (2010) suggested that trait 
and state anxiety could affect different aspects of mechanisms underlying selective attention. 
Specifically, the authors showed that trait anxiety was associated with deficiencies in the goal 
directed top-down control processing (i.e., executive network), whereas state anxiety was 
associated with bottom-up processing which increases sensitivity to task-relevant stimuli. 
Given these findings, it is plausible to argue that trait anxiety are associated with impaired 
task-set reconfiguration processes which mainly implicate top-down cognitive processes 
(Rogers & Monsell, 1995), whereas state anxiety can be associated with impaired proactive 
interference which implicate bottom-up processing (Wylie & Allport, 2000). This view, 





would impair task-switching in a similar manner, specifically by influencing task-set 
reconfiguration. Thus, without decomposing switch costs into either task-set reconfiguration 
or proactive interference, it is not possible to verify the theory’s critical assumption and 
identify the locus of impaired switch costs by state and trait anxiety. 
Another crucial assumption of the attentional control theory (Eysenck et al., 2007) 
which needs to be tested is whether anxious individuals in both trait and state anxiety 
compensate performance effectiveness by sacrificing processing efficiency. This assumption 
indicates that anxious individuals are motivated to be conservative in their decisional styles. 
However, the assumption seems inconsistent with existing findings on the positive 
relationship between anxiety and impulsivity (Bellani et al., 2012; Torrubia, Avila, Moltó, & 
Caseras, 2001). Although previous findings that anxiety typically affects RT but not accuracy 
(e.g., Derakshan et al., 2009) appear to support the presence of a compensatory strategy, this 
should be interpreted with caution because overall accuracy on the task is potentially 
vulnerable to ceiling effect (Dixon, 2008) and less reliable (Hartanto, Toh, & Yang, 2016). 
Moreover, given that individual differences in task-switching performance are typically 
observed in RTs rather than accuracy – for example, aging (Kramer, Hahn, & Gopher, 1999; 
Kray, Li, & Lindenberger, 2002) and developmental disorders (Gargaro, May, Sheppard, 
Bardshaw, & Rinehart, 2015) — the absence of the effect of anxiety on accuracy may simply 
reflect an artefact in measurement but not necessarily the presence of a compensatory 
strategy. Therefore, it is essential to examine the presence of a compensatory strategy in 
anxious individuals using a more direct indicator of a compensatory strategy. 
Furthermore, attentional control theory (Eysenck et al., 2007) postulates that the 
negative effect of anxiety on task-switching efficiency is driven by the loss of attention 





the mediating role of worrisome thought in the relationship between anxiety and task-
switching. Some studies which have assessed worrisome thoughts either before or after the 
completion of the task (Harris, 2013; Forster, Elizalde, Castle, & Bishop 2015; Moser, 
Becker, & Moran, 2012) failed to find any relationship between worry and cognitive 
performance, although the reliability of quantifying worrisome thoughts either prospectively 
or retrospectively can be questioned (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). On the other hand, recent 
neuroimaging studies (Bishop, 2008; Forster et al., 2015) suggest that trait anxiety is 
associated with general impoverished attentional control that is not caused by worrisome 
thoughts. Forster et al. (2015) argued that worrisome and task-unrelated thoughts (TUT) are 
in general the product of impoverished attentional control caused by trait anxiety. In favour 
of this, the literature on mind wandering suggests that impoverished attentional control 
increases mind wandering but not the other way around (McVay & Kane, 2009, 2010). These 
conflicting findings highlight the critical need to examine the mediating role of worrisome 
thoughts in the relationship between anxiety and task-switching using an online measure to 
probe TUT.   
In view of these research gaps, the present study pursued five goals. First, I aimed to 
elucidate the specific processing component of task-switching that is affected by anxiety. To 
this end, I employed a classical diffusion model analysis (Ratcliff, 1978), which derives a 
number of meaningful parameters by utilizing information provided by positions, shapes, and 
sizes of empirical RT distributions (Figure 1). The parameters of my primary interest are drift 
rate parameter (v) – which quantifies the speed and direction of information accumulation—
and nondecision time (t0) parameter –which quantifies the duration of all non-decision 
processes such as encoding or response execution. Recent studies which employed a 
diffusion model (Karayanidis et al., 2009; Mansfield, Karayanidis, Jamadar, Heathcote, & 





captures an earlier phase of a task switch which reflects task-set reconfiguration processes, 
while drift rate captures a later phase of a task switch which reflects proactive interference. 
Therefore, examining nondecision time (t0) and drift rate (v) of a diffusion model allows us 
to examine whether impaired switch costs by anxiety is attributed to either task-set 
reconfiguration or proactive interference. Drawing on attentional control theory (Eysenck et 
al., 2007), I hypothesized that both trait and state anxiety would impair switch costs of 
nondecision time parameter but not drift rate parameter, as the former reflects efficiency in 
exerting attentional control in task-set reconfiguration.  
Second, I aimed to examine the relation of anxiety to tendency to use compensatory 
strategies during task-switching. According to the attentional control theory (Eysenck et al., 
2007), anxious individuals are motivated to maintain their performance effectiveness of task-
switching (i.e., the accuracy of task-switching) from the adverse effect of anxiety – owing to 
lesser attentional resources – by compensating performance effectiveness with processing 
efficiency (i.e., slower processing time). In view of this, the parameter called boundary 
separation (a) – which quantifies the speed-accuracy trade-off in responding—is useful to test 
the link between anxiety and the presence of compensatory strategies. High boundary 
separation is characterized by higher accuracy at the cost of slower RT (Starns & Ratcliff, 
2010), reflecting a more conservative decisional styles, which is consistent with the notion of 
a compensatory strategy as suggested by attentional control theory (Eysenck et al., 2007). 
Thus, I hypothesized that if anxiety maintains performance effectiveness (accuracy) at the 
expense of processing efficiency (RT) during task-switching, boundary separation should 
increase as a function of state or trait anxiety in task-switching paradigm. Specifically, 
anxiety would be positively associated with boundary separation parameters of blocks that 
require task-switching (mixed blocks), but not in blocks that does not require task-switching 





strategy to maintain high accuracy during task-switching—which occurs in mixed blocks 
only—rather than their overall tendency to be conservative in general. Furthermore, if the 
negative effect of anxiety on task-switching effectiveness was suppressed by a compensatory 
strategy, I would observe impaired task-switching effectiveness due to anxiety when the 
compensatory strategy was controlled in the analysis.  
Third, I aimed to examine the relationship between anxiety and mixing costs of the 
task-switching paradigm. Because task-switching has been typically conceptualized as switch 
costs which implicate transient control processes at a local level where switching from one 
task set to another occurs (Monsell, 2003), extant literature has focused on the relationship 
between anxiety and switch costs only (Ansari et al., 2008; Edwards et al., 2015; Derakshan 
et al., 2009). However, although task-switching entails not only switch costs but also mixing 
costs that arise from global control mechanisms in monitoring and maintaining two 
competing task sets (Braver, Reynolds, & Donaldson, 2003; Rubin & Meiran, 2005), little 
research has examined the relationship between anxiety and mixing costs. Therefore, it is 
critical to examine whether the adverse effect of anxiety could be extended to global control 
mechanisms in task-switching, which is essential in facilitating task-switching performance 
by optimizing preparation to switch in advance (Braver et al., 2003). To this end, I 
hypothesized that if anxiety impairs processing efficiency of task-switching performances as 
predicted by the attentional control theory, both state and trait anxiety would also incur 
greater mixing costs.  
Fourth, I aimed to examine the mediating role of TUT in the relationship between 
anxiety and task-switching. In order to assess TUT without resorting to prospective or 
retrospective measurement, I employed thought probe technique (Stawarczyk et al. 2011; 





report at random points whether their immediately preceding thoughts were on- or off-task. 
Despite the introspective nature of thought probe technique, previous studies demonstrated 
that TUT measured by online thought probe technique is reasonably valid and predicts 
cognitive performances significantly better than other objective markers of mind-wandering 
reports, such as intra-individual RT patterns (McVay &Kane, 2012). Moreover, to further test 
predictions of attentional control theory, I modified the thought probe technique to 
differentiate between non-threatening TUT (e.g., daydreaming) and threatening TUT (e.g., 
worries). Based the prediction by attentional control theory that anxiety reduces attentional 
focus during task-switching by increasing internal threat-related worrisome thoughts, I 
hypothesized that the deleterious effect of anxiety on task-switching would be significantly 
mediated by the frequency of threatening TUT but not by that of non-threatening TUT. 
However, if the frequency of threatening TUT does not mediate the effect of anxiety on task-
switching, it may support the alternative view from the recent findings in neuroimaging 
(Forster et al., 2015), which argued that impoverished prefrontal mechanisms in anxious 
individuals are not caused by worrisome thoughts but instead simply reflects an inherent 
characteristic of trait anxiety.  
Lastly, I aimed to explore the moderating effect of WMC on the relationship between 
anxiety and task-switching. Although attentional control theory predicts that anxiety impairs 
processing efficiency, some studies failed to replicate this even when similar tasks were 
employed (e.g., Harris, 2013; Unsworth et al., 2009). Furthermore, a meta-analysis by Seipp 
(1991) showed that the negative correlation between anxiety and test performance was 
heterogeneous, indicating that some studies found null effects of anxiety or even positive 
association between anxiety and performance. These inconsistent findings suggest potential 
boundary conditions where anxiety is unthreatening or even beneficial for processing 





information in the face of concurrent interference (Miyake et al., 2000)—as a potential 
moderator. My exploration of WMC was motivated by recent studies which suggested WMC 
could minimize the cognitive implication of anxiety. For instance, Owens, Stevenson, 
Hadwin and Norgate (2014) found that WMC significantly moderated the relationship 
between anxiety and mathematical performance. Specifically, anxiety and mathematical 
performance were positively correlated (i.e., anxiety benefits mathematical performance) 
among participants with high WMC, but negatively correlated among participants with low 
WMC (i.e., anxiety impairs mathematical performance). Similarly, Johnson and Gronlund 
(2009) found that high WMC individuals were not affected by their trait anxiety when 
performing on a dual-task which consisted of a highly demanding memory task as a primary 
task and an auditory probe task as a secondary task. These findings suggest that individual 
differences in WMC may provide a shield from deleterious effect of anxiety. Given this, it is 
plausible that WMC moderates the relationship between anxiety and cognitive performance 
in task-switching. Hence, I hypothesized that anxiety would impair task-switching 
performances only among individuals with low WMC. In contrast, I expect that anxiety 












CHAPTER 2: METHOD 
Participants 
One hundred and sixty undergraduates (female = 119) from a local university in 
Singapore participated in the study for extra course credits. Two participants were excluded 
due to technical error during the switching task. Five participants who reported feeling unwell 
(e.g., gastric, vertigo, or headache) during the data collection were also excluded from the 
analysis. The exclusion resulted in a total sample of 152 participants (female = 113), with an 
average age of 20.9 years (SD = 1.74, range = 18–26). These participants came from varying 
socioeconomic status (SES) levels, as indexed by their monthly household income in 
Singapore dollars: less than $2,500 (8.6%), $2,500-S$4,999 (17.8%), $5,000-S$7,499 
(20.4%), $7,500-S$9,999 (15.8%), $10,000-S$12,499 (12.5%), $12,500-S$14,999 (7.9%), 
$15,000-S$17,499 (7.2%), $17,500 -S$19,999 (3.3%), and more than S$20,000 (6.6%).  
Materials 
 Task-switching paradigm with thought probing. The task-switching paradigm 
(Rubin & Meiran, 2005) was employed to examine switch costs and mixing costs. In the task-
switching paradigm, participants were asked to respond as fast and accurately as possible to 
either the color (red or green) or shape (circle or triangle) of a bivalent stimulus (i.e., red 
triangle and green circle), according to the cue given. Participants responded by pressing 
either the left key, marked “red” and “circle,” or the right key, marked “green” and “triangle” 
with these keys counterbalanced across participants. Participants were instructed to complete 
one practice block (comprising 30 trials) and eight experimental blocks including two pure 
blocks at the start—pure-color and shape blocks, the order of which was counterbalanced 
across participants—and four mixed blocks, and another two pure blocks at the end, all of 





thus, did not require task-switching. Mixed blocks, however, consisted of two possible cues 
and therefore required task-switching in an unpredictable manner. Mixed blocks involved 
either repeat or switch trials. In repeat trials, a task which was same as the previous one was 
repeatedly presented, whereas in switch trial, a task which was different from the previous 
task (e.g., color task) was presented, which in turn required task-switching. Switch costs were 
calculated by subtracting performance index (mean RTs, accuracy) on repeat trials from that 
on switch trials, whereas mixing costs were calculated by subtracting the relevant index of 
performance on pure trials in pure blocks from that of repeat trials in mixed blocks (Rubin & 
Meiran, 2005).  
Each pure block is comprised of 40 trials, while mixed-block is comprised of 80 trials. 
For the mixed blocks, half of the trials involved task-switching, while the other half did not; 
these trials were randomly presented with a maximum of four consecutive trials of the same 
task. As such, there were 160 trials for each type of trials (pure, repeat, and switch trials). 
Color gradient and a row of small black shapes were used as cues to indicate color and shape 
tasks, respectively. There were two possible targets (i.e., a red triangle or a green circle). For 
each trial, a fixation cross appeared for 350 ms and was followed by a blank screen for 150 
ms. Subsequently, the cue appeared for 250 ms and was followed by the target. During the 
switching task, participants were periodically prompted by probing questions and asked to 
press one of seven keys to indicate what they were thinking immediately prior to the 
presentation of the probe. Thought-probing questions are as follows; (1) I am totally focused 
on the current task; (2) I am thinking about my performance on the task or how long it is 
taking; (3) I am thinking about some of my concerns, troubles, or fears; (4) I am thinking 
some important stuff or recent worries; (5) I am distracted by information present in the room 
(sights or sounds); (6) I am having some fantasies that are disconnected from reality; (7) I am 





thoughts, while option 2 was coded as task-related interference (TRI). We distinguished 
between on-task thoughts and TRI as the latter was argued to reflect a form of lapse in 
attention as the participant is not fully focused on the task (Smallwood et al., 2004). We 
further coded option 3 and 4 as threatening TUT, option 5 as external distraction, and option 
6 and 7 as non-threatening TUT.  
Thought probe randomly occurred toward the end of 15% of the trials in both pure 
and mixed blocks. Thought-probe prompts were pseudo-randomized to occur equally before 
each type of trials (e.g., repeat and switch trials). Since it is believed that thought probe 
questions likely incur proactive interference during task-switching, all of my later analysis 
removed those trials that were preceded by thought probes.  
Complex span tasks. Rotation-span and symmetry-span tasks were employed to 
measure WMC (Foster et al., 2015). In the rotation-span task, participants were instructed to 
judge whether a rotated letter mirrored the target letter. Subsequently, an arrow of either short 
or long length pointing in one of eight different directions appeared and participants were 
asked to remember both the length and the direction of the arrow. The rotated letter and 
arrow sequence would be repeated from two to five times for each trial with unpredictable 
length.  
In the symmetry-span task, participants were instructed to judge whether a displayed 
shape is symmetrical along its vertical axis. Subsequently, a red square appeared in a 4x4 grid 
and participants were asked to remember the location of the red square. The symmetry and 
location sequence was repeated from two to five times for each trial with unpredictable 
length. In both rotation- and symmetry-span tasks, the set size (i.e., the total number of 
arrows to remember) varied from two to five per trial. Scores in each task were computed by 





the proportion of the total number of correct recall responses in a set (Conway et al., 2005). 
Subsequently, PCU scores from rotation-span and symmetry-span tasks were summed to 
compute participant’s WMC.   
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI). State and trait version of STAI (Spielberg, 
Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983) were employed to measure participants’ state and 
trait anxiety, respectively. The scale contained 20 items to measure state anxiety (α = .90) and 
20 items to measure trait anxiety (α = .90) on a 4-point Likert scale. Scores for the 20 items 
were summed to compute the score for state anxiety and trait anxiety.   
Procedure 
 Participants were seated individually in an open cubicle and then asked to sign an 
informed consent form. Subsequently, participants were asked to complete a state version of 
STAI before proceeding to the switching task with thought probing. Upon the completion of 
this, participants were instructed to complete rotation- and symmetry-span tasks. Finally, 
participants completed a demographic survey and trait version of STAI. The entire task took 











CHAPTER 3: Results 
Switch Costs 
 Accuracy and RT. Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analyses were conducted 
to examine the predictability of state and trait anxiety in the effectiveness (accuracy) and 
efficiency (RT) of switch costs in task-switching. For the analysis in RT, the accurate 
responses that were either 2.5 SD above or below an individual’s mean were excluded 
separately for pure blocks and mixed blocks.  
I found that state anxiety marginally predicted switch costs in RT (B = 1.94, SE = 
1.04, Beta = .15, 95% CI [-0.12, 4.00], t = 1.87, p = .064), but not switch costs in accuracy (B 
= 0.00, SE = 0.00, Beta = -.06, 95% CI [0.00, 0.00], t = -0.75, p = .453). Trait anxiety also 
marginally predicted switch costs in RT (B = 1.66, SE = 1.00, Beta = .14, 95% CI [-0.30, 
3.63], t = 1.67, p = .097), but not switch costs in accuracy (B = 0.00, SE = 0.00, Beta = .04, 
95% CI [-0.00, 0.00], t = 0.51, p = .608). These results suggest that state and trait anxiety 
influence processing efficiency but not performance effectiveness of task-switching.  
 Diffusion model analysis. We performed a diffusion model analysis to decompose 
switch costs into task-set reconfiguration and proactive interference. In my analysis, drift rate 
(v), nondecision time (t0), and boundary separation (a) were allowed to vary freely across 
pure, repeat, and switch trials. Following the recommendation by Voss, Nagler, and Lerche 
(2013), starting point (zr) was fixed in the middle between the two response barriers (i.e., zr = 
0.5). Similarly, variability parameters and response-execution differences (d) were fixed to 
zero, except for the inter-trial variability of nondecisional components (st0), which were held 
constant across trials (Hartanto & Yang, 2016; Voss et al., 2013). Parameters were estimated 
using Fast-dm for each participant, with Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) statistic for optimization 





Huizinga (2014), I conducted a series of simulations to estimate decision time parameters that 
were purely driven by drift rate but not by boundary separation. First, I performed 
simulations to estimate the parameters of diffusion model (e.g., drift rate and nondecision 
time) by fixing the value of each participant’s boundary separation parameter in switch trial 
to the value of each participant’s boundary separation parameter in repeat trial. Subsequently, 
using the value I obtained from the simulation, I further simulated estimated RTs for each 
participant in both repeat and switch trials. The values of nondecision time parameter in 
repeat and switch trials were then subtracted from the estimated total RT in repeat and switch 
trials respectively to compute the values of decision time in each participant. Later, switch 
costs in decision time that is driven purely by drift rate parameter – which captures proactive 
interference processes – were calculated by subtracting the decision time of repeat trials from 
that of switch trials, while switch costs in nondecison time parameter – which captures task-
set reconfiguration processes – were calculated by subtracting nondecision time of repeat 
trials from that of switch trials.  
 Similar to the above analyses for accuracy and RT, a new set of regression analyses 
was conducted to elucidate the specific component of task-switching that is associated with 
state and trait anxiety. As shown in Figure 2, I found that state anxiety significantly predicted 
switch costs in nondecision time (B = 2.18, SE = 0.96, Beta = .18, 95% CI [0.29, 4.08], t = 
2.27, p = .024), but not switch costs in decision time (B = 0.05, SE = 0.92, Beta = .00, 95% 
CI [-1.77, 1.86], t = -0.05, p = .960). In contrast, trait anxiety significantly predicted neither 
switch costs in nondecision time (B = 1.52, SE = 0.92, Beta = .13, 95% CI [-0.31, 3.34], t = 
1.64, p = .102), nor decision time (B = 0.49, SE = 0.88, Beta = .05, 95% CI [-1.24, 2.22], t = 
0.56, p = .575). These findings suggest that only state anxiety was associated with impaired 






 To examine anxious individuals’ use of compensatory strategies during task-
switching, regression analyses were conducted to predict boundary separation parameters of a 
diffusion model with state or trait anxiety as predictors. We found that state anxiety was a 
significant predictor of boundary separation in repeat trials (B = 0.01, SE = 0.00, Beta = .22, 
95% CI [0.00, 0.02], t = 2.81, p = .006) and switch trials (B = 0.01, SE = 0.00, Beta = .18, 
95% CI [0.00, 0.02], t = 2.19, p = .030), but not in pure trials (B = 0.00, SE = 0.00, Beta = 
.10, 95% CI [-0.00, 0.01], t = 1.28, p = .202). Similarly, trait anxiety was a significant 
predictor of boundary separation in repeat trials (B = 0.01, SE = 0.00, Beta = .16, 95% CI 
[0.00, 0.02], t = 2.00, p = .047) and switch trials (B = 0.01, SE = 0.00, Beta = .16, 95% CI 
[0.00, 0.02], t = 1.98, p = .049), but not in pure trials (B = 0.00, SE = 0.00, Beta = .07, 95% 
CI [-0.00, 0.01], t = 0.91, p = .367). These findings suggest that individuals with greater state 
or trait anxiety were more conservative only during tasks which required task-switching, and 
they compensated performance effectiveness by sacrificing processing efficiency (see Figure 
3).  
 Furthermore, I conducted hierarchical regression analyses to examine whether 
compensatory strategy suppressed the negative effect of anxiety on performance effectiveness 
of task-switching. In the first step, anxiety was included in the model to predict performance 
effectiveness of task-switching. In the second step, boundary separation in both repeat and 
switch trials were included in the model to estimate the unique effect of anxiety on 
performance effectiveness without the influence of compensatory strategy. State anxiety and 
trait anxiety were analysed in a separate model. Switch cost in accuracy was used as an 
indicator of performance effectiveness of task-switching. Other than switch costs in accuracy, 





and accuracy to form a single, comprehensive score of task-switching performance (Hughes, 
Linck, Bowles, Koeth, & Bunting, 2014; see Draheim, Hicks, & Engle, 2016, for details on 
calculating switch costs by using the binning procedure). As the binning procedure takes into 
account accuracy in calculating switch costs, it can be used as another proxy indicator of 
performance effectiveness which has higher reliability than typical switch costs in accuracy 
(Hughes et al., 2014). As shown in Table 2, in the first step, state anxiety did not significantly 
predict switch costs of accuracy (p = .453) and binning procedure (p = .114). However, after 
controlling for boundary separations in repeat and switch trials in the second step, state 
anxiety marginally predicted switch costs in accuracy (p = .063) and significantly predicted 
switch costs calculated by the binning procedure (p = .002), suggesting that compensatory 
strategy as indicated by boundary separation parameters of a diffusion model suppressed the 
relationship between state anxiety and indicators of performance effectiveness in task-
switching. Nevertheless, the suppressing effect of compensatory strategy was not evident in 
trait anxiety.    
Mixing Costs 
 We conducted regression analyses to investigate the predictability of state and trait 
anxiety on the effectiveness and efficiency of mixing costs in the task-switching paradigm. 
Similar to the above analyses for switch costs, accurate responses that were either 2.5 SD 
above or below an individual’s mean were excluded separately for pure blocks and mixed 
blocks. As shown in Figure 4, we found that state anxiety was a significant predictor of 
mixing costs in RT (B = 3.76, SE = 1.48, Beta = .20, 95% CI [0.84, 6.68], t = 2.55, p = .012), 
but not in accuracy (B = 0.00, SE = 0.00, Beta = -.03, 95% CI [0.00, 0.00], t = -0.38, p = 
.701). However, I found that trait anxiety was not a significant predictor of mixing costs in 





accuracy (B = 0.00, SE = 0.00, Beta = -.04, 95% CI [-0.00, 0.00], t = 0.54, p = .592). These 
results suggest that only state anxiety is associated with impaired efficiency of mixing costs.  
Task-unrelated Thoughts 
 We conducted mediation analyses to examine whether threatening or non-threatening 
TUT significantly mediated the relationship between anxiety and task-switching. Here, I 
focused solely on state anxiety as my independent variable (IV) due to the fact that most of 
my analyses failed to find any significant relationship between trait anxiety and either switch 
or mixing costs. Three potential mediators were analysed, including (1) threatening TUT, (2) 
non-threatening TUT, and (3) total TUT (threatening TUT + non-threatening TUT). Note that 
I also considered the total TUT because most of previous studies on TUT and cognitive 
performance did not take into account the difference between threatening and non-threatening 
TUT (see Table 3 for the proportion of each type of conscious experience during thought-
probe). Lastly, only criterions that were found to be significantly associated with state anxiety 
were considered, including (a) nondecision time (t0) of swich costs, (b) mixing costs in RT, 
(c) boundary separations of repeat trials, and (d) boundary separations of switch trials. 
Multiple mediation models were estimated through the PROCESS macro (Hayes, 2009) with 
bias-corrected bootstrapping of 10,000 samples for all of the analyses. Mediation is 
considered significant if the 95% bias-corrected confidence intervals for indirect effects do 
not encompass zero (Preacher & Hayes, 2004). As shown in the Table 4, state anxiety was 
positively associated with TUT, which is mostly driven by threatening TUT. However, 
threatening TUT, nonthreatening TUT, and total TUT did not significantly predict any of my 
criterions (e.g., switch costs of nondecision time, mixing costs of RT). As a results, across 12 
mediation models, the indirect effect of state anxiety on indicators of task-switching 






 We performed a series of moderation analyses using process macro (model 1; Hayes, 
2012) to examine whether WMC significantly moderated the effect of state or trait anxiety on 
indicators of task-switching performance. Due to a technical problem, one participant’s data 
from rotation-span and symmetry-span tasks separately were excluded from moderation 
analyses. As shown in Table 5, the interaction terms between anxiety and WMC did not 
significantly predict any of indices of task-switching performance, indicating that WMC did 

















CHAPTER 4: DISCUSSION 
My experiment revealed five major findings on the extent and mechanisms of the 
relationship between anxiety and task-switching (switch and mixing costs). First, I elucidated 
the specific component of task-switching that is affected by anxiety. Using a diffusion model 
analysis, I decomposed switch costs into parameters of nondecision time and drift rate (i.e., 
decision time) – which primarily reflect task-set reconfiguration and proactive interference 
processes respectively (Schmitz & Voss, 2012, 2014). I found that state anxiety was 
associated with higher switch costs of nondecision time parameter but not switch costs of 
drift rate (i.e., decision time) parameter, suggesting that state anxiety impaired task-set 
reconfiguration but not proactive interference processes of task-switching. This finding 
supports the assumption of attention control theory (Eysenck et al., 2007), in which the 
adverse effect of anxiety on switch costs is argued due to impaired efficiency of exerting 
attentional control during task-set reconfiguration. In contrast, regarding the effect of trait 
anxiety on switch costs, I found either marginally significant or null results. While this result 
may contradict some studies which have found significant relationship between trait anxiety 
and switch costs (Edwards et al., 2015; Derakshan et al., 2009), it is important to note that 
attentional control theory assumes that trait anxiety is simply a predisposition toward 
experiencing state anxiety (Eysenck et al., 2007; Spielberger et al., 1970). Thus, it is plausible 
that impaired processing efficiency in task-switching is more directly related to state anxiety 
than trait anxiety (see Booth & Peker, 2016 for similar findings).    
Second, I found a direct evidence supporting the existence of compensatory strategy 
related to anxiety. According to attentional control theory (Eysenck et al., 2007), anxious 
individuals are motivated to retain their performance effectiveness of task-switching from the 
adverse effect of anxiety by compensating the performance effectiveness with processing 





task-switching accuracy. Using a diffusion model, I argued that the compensatory strategy as 
illustrated by attentional control theory could be reflected by a high boundary separation 
parameter – which characterize higher accuracy at the cost of slower RT. Consistent with my 
hypothesis, I found that both state and trait anxiety were positively associated with boundary 
separation parameters of mixed-block but not pure-block of task-switching paradigm. The 
results suggest that anxious individuals selectively compensate performance effectiveness by 
sacrificing processing efficiency when the tasks are demanding and require extra attentional 
control to switch from one task to another. More importantly, I demonstrated that the adverse 
effect of state anxiety on indicators of performance effectiveness of switch costs emerged 
when boundary separation in mixed-block was controlled in the analyses. The result supports 
attentional control theory and provides evidence that compensatory strategy ameliorates the 
adverse effect of state anxiety on indicators of performance effectiveness in task-switching. 
My result also casts doubt on possible argument that differential effects of anxiety on 
performance effectiveness and processing efficiency are simply due to measurement artefact 
caused by lower reliability and ceiling effects in accuracy measures of task-switching. 
Third, I extended current understanding of cognitive consequences of anxiety in 
mixing costs of task-switching. Unlike previous studies which have focused solely on switch 
costs (Edwards et al., 2015; Derakshan et al., 2009), the switching task used in the present 
study was also designed to measure mixing costs, which reflect global sustained control 
mechanisms in monitoring and maintaining two competing task sets (Rubin & Meiran, 2005). 
To this end, I found that state anxiety was associated with higher mixing costs in RT but 
those in accuracy. The result shows that anxiety does not only impair task-set reconfiguration 
processes, but also the processing efficiency of maintaining multiple task sets and resolving 





in maintaining two competing task sets is essential in facilitating successful completion of 
task-switching, as it optimizes the preparation to switch in advances (Braver et al., 2003).  
Fourth, although threatening TUT was significantly higher in anxious individuals, I 
did not find any mediating role of threatening or non-threatening TUT on the relationship 
between anxiety and task-switching performances. This finding is consistent with recent 
studies that failed to find any relationship between worry and cognitive performance (Harris, 
2013; Forster et al., 2015; Moser et al., 2012). It is noteworthy, however, that TUT in the 
present study was associated with slower RT in all types of trials in task-switching paradigm, 
pure (r = .221, p = .006), repeat (r = .221, p = .006), and switch (r = .189, p = .020), 
suggesting that the occurrence of TUT could indiscriminately impairs processing efficiency 
in general across all types of trials, possibly due to lapse of attention during mind wandering 
(McVay & Kane, 2009). As the adverse effect of TUT frequency is not trial-specific, its 
effect on task-switching could be neutralized when switch costs or mixing costs were 
calculated using difference scores between two different types of trials (e.g., switch trials and 
repeat trials). Alternatively, it is also plausible that switch costs and mixing costs of task-
switching paradigm are more likely to be affected by the intensity rather than merely the 
frequency of worrisome thoughts. As argued by attentional control theory (Eysenck et al., 
2007), impaired task-switching by anxiety is due to the preferential allocation of attentional 
resources to worrisome thoughts, which resulted in the loss of attentional resources for 
ongoing task-switching. Given this argument, it is plausible that the proportion of attentional 
resources that is distributed between ongoing task-switching and worrisome thoughts could 
vary across different intensity of worrisome thought. For instance, worrying about failing on 
an official exam might consume more attentional resources than worrying about failing on a 





thought in examining the mediating role of TUT on the relationship between anxiety and 
task-switching.  
The insignificant mediating role of TUT on the relationship between anxiety and task-
switching could also relate to recent neuroimaging studies which have found that high trait 
anxious individuals showed impoverished prefrontal mechanisms in the brain that govern 
attentional control (Bishop et al., 2008; Forster et al., 2015). The neuroimaging findings 
proposed that the anxiety-related deficit in prefrontal mechanisms does not arise from state 
anxiety or worrisome thoughts but reflects an underlying characteristic of trait anxiety. 
However, these findings are not consistent with current findings that impaired processing 
efficiency in task-switching in terms of switch costs and mixing costs is more directly related 
to state anxiety than trait anxiety. Thus, more research should be conducted to examine 
whether state anxiety could also temporarily impair the recruitment of prefrontal mechanisms 
underlying task-switching performance.  
Lastly, I found that WMC did not moderate any relationship between anxiety and 
task-switching performance. My exploration on the moderating role of WMC in the 
relationship between anxiety and task-switching performance was motivated by recent studies 
that found WMC attenuated the adverse effect of trait anxiety on performance on 
mathematical problems (Owens et al., 2014) and memory task in the dual-task paradigm 
(Johnson & Gronlund, 2009). However, the moderating effect of WMC on task-switching 
performance was not conceptually replicated, demonstrating that WMC does not prevent the 
detrimental effect of anxiety during task-switching. My result suggests that the beneficial 
effect of WMC in attenuating deleterious effect of anxiety can be task specific. Specifically, 
it is plausible the interaction between anxiety and WMC can only emerge when the 
participants are examined by using cognitive tasks that highly demand the ability to maintain 





and dual-task paradigm with high memory load (Raghubar, Barnes, & Hecht, 2010; Redick et 
al., in press). In contrast, although task-switching and WMC are often categorized under the 
umbrella of executive functions, research has demonstrated that task-switching costs (i.e., 
switch costs and mixing costs) implicate many aspect of cognitive processes that are distinct 
from WMC (Miyake et al., 2000; Rubin & Meiran, 2005). This could explain why the 
interaction between anxiety and WMC was not observed in the current study.  
 My study is not without its limitations. Given that current study focused on naturally 
occurring variations in state anxiety, the causality aspect of the study was not well-
established due to the lack of manipulation in state anxiety. Although my study is based on 
attentional control theory that theorized the impaired task-switching performances is caused 
by anxiety (Eysenck et al., 2007), the conclusion of the current study could be strengthened 
by future studies which experimentally manipulate state anxiety before instructing 
participants to complete task-switching paradigm. Furthermore, given that I only employed 
colour-shape variant of task-switching paradigm, it is worthwhile for future study to examine 
the robustness of my findings using other variants of task-switching paradigm in computing 
switch costs and mixing costs. Employing more than one variant of task-switching paradigm 
would allow future study to circumvent possible task impurity issue in task-switching 
paradigm (Miyake et al., 2000).  
 In summary, the current study contributes to elucidating several theoretical 
assumptions on the relationship between anxiety and task-switching. Consistent with 
attentional control theory (Eysenck et al., 2007), I identified the locus of task-switching 
impairment in state anxious individuals is pertinent to task-set reconfiguration processes. I 
also presented a direct evidence demonstrating the presence of compensatory strategy among 





costs, my result extends the implication of anxiety not only to transient control of task-set 
reconfiguration but also to global sustained control mechanisms in monitoring and maintain 
two competing task sets during task-switching. However, my further mediation analyses 
indicate that the frequency of TUT does not mediate the adverse effect of state anxiety on 
task-switching performances. Lastly, I did not find any evidence that support the possibility 
that WMC could shield the negative effect of anxiety on task-switching performances. These 
findings contribute to my understanding on the extent and mechanism underlying the 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Anxiety, Task-switching, and Working Memory Measures 
 M SD Range Skewness Kurtosis 
Anxiety (STAI)      
   State 40.04 8.77 23.00 – 69.00 0.64 0.85 
   Trait 46.70 9.19 27.00 – 71.00 0.14 -0.59 
Boundary separation (a)      
   Pure trials 1.26 0.31 0.50 – 2.38 0.65 0.72 
   Repeat trials 1.90 0.44 0.80 – 2.87 0.12 -0.41 
   Switch trials 1.80 0.44 0.83 – 2.94 0.47 -0.22 
Switch costs      
   Accuracy (%) -0.08 0.05 -0.25 – -0.03 -0.94 0.72 
   RT (ms) 234 113 -22 – 620 0.73 0.90 
   Decision time (ms) 112 99 -265 – 366 -0.06 1.16 
   Nondecision time (ms) 148 105 -78 – 520 0.80 1.03 
Mixing costs      
   Accuracy (%) -0.01 0.04 -0.19 – 0.22 0.08 11.31 
   RT (ms) 311 162 3 – 935 0.93 1.20 
Working Memory      
   Rotation-span1  5.72 1.39 0.53 – 8.25 -1.00 1.36 
   Symmetry-span1  6.21 1.27 1.73 – 8.00 -1.30 2.16 
   Total score2  11.94 2.22 3.73 – 15.45 -1.24 1.93 
1 Data from 1 participant was missing 













Table 2. Summary of Multiple Regression Analyses for Predicting Switch Costs in Accuracy 
and Binning Procedure 
 Step 1  Step 2 
 B   (SE) p  B   (SE) p 
Model 1: DV = Switch costs (accuracy)      
    State anxiety .000 (.000) .453  -0.001 (.000) .063 
    Boundary separation (repeat trials) - -  0.025 (.014) .061 
    Boundary separation (switch trials) - -  0.025 (.014) .083 
      
Model 2: DV = Switch costs (binning)      
    State anxiety 0.021 (.013) .114  0.037 (.012) .002 
    Boundary separation (repeat trials) - -  0.301 (.356) .399 
    Boundary separation (switch trials) - -  -1.677 (.362) .000 
      
Model 3: DV = Switch costs (accuracy)      
    Trait anxiety 0.000 (.000) .514  0.000 (.000) .786 
    Boundary separation (repeat trials) - -  0.021 (.014) .138 
    Boundary separation (switch trials) - -  0.026 (.014) .065 
      
Model 4: DV = Switch costs (binning)      
    Trait anxiety 0.007 (.012) .571  0.017 (.012) .148 
    Boundary separation (repeat trials) - -  -1.555 (.367) .000 
    Boundary separation (switch trials) - -  0.282 (.365) .441 
Note. Higher values reflect better performance in switch costs of accuracy while lower values 













Table 3. Proportions of Each Type of Conscious Experience during Task-switching across Pure and Mixed-blocks 
 On-task TRI Threatening TUT Non-threatening TUT ED 
Total  0.55 (0.31) 0.28 (0.25) 0.08 (0.17) 0.07 (0.12) 0.03 (0.06) 
  Pure  0.62 (0.33) 0.23 (0.26) 0.07 (0.18) 0.06 (0.11) 0.03 (0.06) 
  Mixed 0.51 (0.34) 0.30 (0.28) 0.08 (0.18) 0.07 (0.14) 0.04 (0.07) 


















Effect of IV on 
M (a) 
Effect of M to 
DV (b) 












Switch costs (t0) 0.007 (0.002)** -56.04 (51.68) 2.18 (0.96)* 2.57 (1.02)* -0.39 (0.36) -1.347, 0.085 0.03 
Mixing costs (RT) 0.007 (0.002)** 69.92 (79.61) 3.76 (1.48)* 3.28 (1.58)* 0.48 (0.69) -0.940, 1.888 0.03 
BS of repeat trials 0.007 (0.002)** 0.08 (0.22) 0.01 (0.00)* 0.01 (0.00)* 0.00 (0.00) -0.004, 0.003 0.01 




Switch costs (t0) 0.002 (0.001) 99.99 (71.63) 2.18 (0.96)* 2.02 (0.96)* 0.16 (0.22) -0.107, 0.826 0.01 
Mixing costs (RT) 0.002 (0.001) 103.06 (110.56) 3.76 (1.48)* 3.60 (1.49)* 0.16 (0.26) -0.120, 0.893 0.01 
BS of repeat trials 0.002 (0.001) 0.45 (0.30) 0.01 (0.00)* 0.01 (0.00)* 0.00 (0.00) -0.000, 0.003 0.01 
BS of switch trials 0.002 (0.001) 0.35 (0.30) 0.01 (0.00)* 0.01 (0.00)* 0.00 (0.00) -0.000, 0.003 0.01 
Total 
TUT 
Switch costs (t0) 0.009 (0.002)** -3.06 (44.09) 2.18 (0.96)* 2.21 (1.03)* -0.03 (0.45) -1.016, 0.783 0.00 
Mixing costs (RT) 0.009 (0.002)** 89.04 (67.42) 3.76 (1.48)* 3.00 (1.58) 0.76 (0.61) -0.399, 2.026 0.04 
BS of repeat trials 0.009 (0.002)** 0.22 (0.18) 0.01 (0.00)* 0.01 (0.00)* 0.00 (0.00) -0.001, 0.005 0.04 
BS of switch trials 0.009 (0.002)** 0.11 (0.19) 0.01 (0.00)* 0.01 (0.00)* 0.00 (0.00) -0.003, 0.005 0.02 
Note. SEs are shown in parentheses. State anxiety was included as the independent variable for all of the analyses. Analyses were conducted with 
bias-corrected bootstrapping with 10,000 samples. TUT = task-unrelated thought; switch costs (t0) = switch costs in nondecision times; mixing 











Table 5. Summary of Interactions between Anxiety and WMC on Task-switching 
Interaction DV B SE 95% CI  p 
State anxiety x 
WMC 
SC (RT) -0.069 0.541 -1.138, 1.000 .899 
SC (accuracy) 0.000 0.000 -0.001, 0.001 .903 
SC (t0) -0.100  0.491 -0.871, 1.071 .839 
SC (decision time) -0.549 0.489 -1.516, 0.418 .263 
MC (RT) 0.633,  0.777 -0.902, 2.168 .416 
MC (accuracy) 0.000 0.000 -0.001, 0.000 .069 
BS of pure trials 0.000 0.002 -0.002, 0.003 .852 
BS of repeat trials -0.001 0.002 -0.005, 0.003 .554 
BS of switch trials 0.000 0.002 -0.005, 0.004 .873 
      
Trait anxiety x 
WMC 
SC (RT) 0.463  0.494 -0.513, 1.440 .350 
SC (accuracy) 0.000 0.000 -0.001, 0.000 .278 
SC (t0) -0.200  0.453 -1.095, 0.696 .660 
SC (decision time) 0.473 0.445 -0.407, 1.353 .290 
MC (RT) 0.965 0.717 -0.453, 2.382 .181 
MC (accuracy) 0.000 0.000 -0.001, 0.000 .287 
BS of pure trials 0.001  0.001 -0.004, 0.002 .590 
BS of repeat trials 0.002 0.002 -0.002, 0.006 .264 
BS of switch trials 0.002 0.002 -0.001, 0.006 .215 














Figure 1. Diffusion process underlying the diffusion model. The model assumes that 
decisions are based on the accumulation of information over time until a response boundary 
is reached and a motor response elicited (Ratcliff, 1978; see Voss, Nagler, & Lerche, 2013, 
for a practical introduction to diffusion models). Adapted from Weeda, van der Molen, 
























Figure 2. Scatterplots and regression line on the relationship between anxiety and switch 






















































































































Figure 3. Scatterplots and regression line on the relationship between anxiety and boundary 
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Figure 4. Scatterplots and regression line on the relationship between anxiety and mixing 
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